AI and United States: A ‘Jobless growth’?

Artificial intelligence is emerging as a major driver of US economic growth. More specifically, expectations of sustained productivity gains and strong future profits are fueling the expansion. The main transmission channels are increased capital expenditure and a wealth effect generated by high equity valuations in the tech sector. This dynamic strengthened through 2025 and should carry into 2026, barring a market correction. Meanwhile, the labour market remains muted. Does this raise the risk of a ‘jobless growth’ episode? This is the focus of our chart.

First question – Is growth fueled by AI optimism creating jobs directly? Let’s look at payrolls in sectors linked to the AI rollout. This includes computer and electronic products manufacturing on the goods-producing side; and data processing and hosting, as well as computer systems design on the services side. Scientific research & development and consulting services are also included: while less directly tied to AI, they remain important sources of employment likely to support the cycle. All series are indexed to 100 at the start of 2023 – the year Chat GPT reached mass adoption – with total private payrolls serving as the benchmark.

Over the period, employment growth in these sectors has underperformed total private employment. In fact, every segment in the sample, except consulting, posted a contraction. In other words, these sectors are cutting jobs at the peak of their expansion. The steepest decline comes from computer and electronic products manufacturing. Taken together, the evidence suggests that, to date, AI has not translated into meaningful direct job creation. It also underscores the scale of the challenge in the White House’s policy objective of rebuilding domestic industrial capacity.

Second question – Is AI supporting jobs indirectly, through supply chains or growth spillovers? In December 2025, US private payroll growth slowed to +0.3% y/y, its weakest reading since 2003 outside recessionary periods. This labor market softness stands in stark contrast to real GDP growth, which we estimate at +2.8% y/y in Q4 2025. So, the indirect channel looks no stronger than the direct one, while productivity gains are solid.

Historically, gaps between output growth and employment growth have generally not lasted. So, will this episode follow the same pattern? Will the gap close and, if so, through a rebound in job creation or a slowdown in growth? Or are we entering a durable productivity-led expansion? For now, AI remains largely in the investment phase and concentrated in infrastructure-related sectors. The US adoption rate is still lower than those observed, for example, in Europe. Should we wait for a broader diffusion and wider range of use cases in the US to allow AI to deliver more inclusive growth, particularly in terms of employment? The jury is still out.