The next crash and lessons from the great crash of 2008/9

Beginning in 2008 the West suffered its largest downturn since the 1929 Wall Street crash. The immediate cause was defaults on subprime mortgages, but it was how this relatively minor part of the overall economy infected the whole financial system that inflicted the damage.
The crisis became crystalized around the collapse of two firms, Lehman brothers (15th September 2008) and AIG (16th September 2008). Let’s look at each in turn:
Lehman
Lehman had built up a large mortgage business having acquired five mortgage lenders and two loan brokers in 2003/4. A significant share of this business was subprime. At the time of the crisis in 2008 Lehman’s free capital (shareholders equity) was only around 3% of its loan book so in the event of a writedown of the latter it would be underwater and would need a fresh influx of capital or go into administration. This is, in fact, what happened as from 2006 onwards Goldman Sachs started to write down to 50-60 cents on the dollar the value of subprime mortgages and demanded the rest of the market do the same.
The Lehman collapse on 15th September 2008 would then have been a regular bankruptcy with debt written down and assets sold off, and all of Wall Street just a few billion worse off, were it not for the Lehman Brothers Special Financing division.
Lehman Special Financing was a broker/dealer and counterparty in Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). These are an insurance taken out by lenders against the risk of default. However, a vast secondary market in CDSs has evolved that in gross is ten times as large as the underlying insured risks as all manner of market participants take positions and lay off bets on the underlying securities. These CDS contracts often require counterparties to post collateral to prove that the CDS will be honored. Collateral posted to Lehman was often rehypothecated, i.e. it was in turn used as collateral.
When Lehman went into administration it rippled right through the CDS market and effectively caused it to freeze. Due to the opacity of many of the underlying risks insured, due to packaging and bundling of risks of different quality, there was great uncertainty in the market as to who would end up paying.
Thus, a standard bankruptcy, albeit a large one, ended up risking the stability of the entire system and having an effect similar to the Wall Street crash of 1929.
AIG
There were two major sources of losses in AIG – AIG Global Securities – agent for its life division – and AIG Financial Products division.
In its life assurance business it was heavily invested in securitized sub-prime mortgages and then it was lending these to short sellers and repurchasing after usually one month. The way this would work would be: Par value is 100 and short seller buys a put option at 90. The put will only be exercised if the value falls below 90. Otherwise seller (AIG) pockets the cost of the put. When the Lehman crisis broke the value of these fell significantly (similar to Goldman’s 50-60 cents on the dollar) and AIG was on the hook for the difference.
Given that most of these are short term contracts for one month duration this was a significant failure in risk management on the part of AIG in not anticipating this event given that it had been flagged by Goldman since 2006.
In the financial products division AIG was a counterparty to CDS contracts with major international banks but the risks assumed were considered very high quality and very unlikely to default; i.e. they were not subprime mortgages. In 2005 AIG’s rating was downgraded from AAA to AA+ following an SEC probe over its accounting practices. This was of significance when the Lehman crisis broke as AAA rated entities are not required to post collateral but the same does not apply to lower rated entities but AIG would have been downgraded over the losses in its life division in any case. When Lehman went into administration the market price of all CDS securities collapsed and entities were required to use mark to market accounting such that underwater CDSs required collateral posted. It was the extent of the required collateral following this event that caused the downfall of AIG.
The AIG argument was that the underlying CDS risks were sound since they did not cover the subprime market and it was mark to market accounting that was the problem. It was market panic and opacity that caused them to be written down. This was in fact borne out since the US Treasury had its loan to AIG repaid when it had worked its way through the crisis. The main risk management issue here for AIG was continuing to transact this business after it had lost its AAA rating or not ceding the risk onwards to other entities.
Shadow banking
Bank of International Settlements – shadow banking definition – all non-bank financial intermediaries other than insurance companies and pension funds
- Money market funds - funds not covered by deposit insurance
- Bond funds
- Equity funds
- Real Estate Funds
- Hedge Funds
- Exchange traded funds
- Private equity
- Securitization
- Leasing
- Own account dealers
- Venture capital
- Brokers
- Brass plate & holding companies
The main issue is that shadow banking has no access to public sources of liquidity so they can’t access Central bank funding in the event of a run. This point would also apply to off balance sheet and special purpose vehicles used by banks.
In China there were a number of issues:
- Banks using accounting tricks to avoid reserve requirement regulations
- Vast amount of real estate funding through shadow banking mechanisms
- Much of the Western type shadow banking institutions are underdeveloped in China
In the event of an implosion in China; e.g. if a large number of property companies were to go into liquidation, then the losses would be borne by their debt holders which would ripple through the financial system and affect the real economy. However, so long as the Government guarantees the banking system there is no systemic risk.
Risks today
The main issue looming over the world economy today is the possibility of an implosion in asset prices and the commencement of a long bear market. This would wipe out savings for individuals leading to lower incomes in retirement. For corporations it would lead to significant writedowns in the values of their holdings forcing them, in many cases, to raise new funding.
For China they are probably due a slowdown after decades of continuous expansion. However, individual savings rates are much higher in China than in the US. That is a reflection of China being a country on the way up where people have faced insecurity all their lives. Were the State to boost social protections (e.g. healthcare, pensions etc) this would allow people to save less and stimulate consumption in the event of a downturn.
In China central government debt is very low – about 20% of GDP and official local government debt is somewhat higher. Local governments also have substantial debt in various off balance sheet financing vehicles. The rate of economic growth plus inflation has exceeded interest rates for a long number of years so this drives the ratio downwards; e.g. if inflation is 2% and GDP growth 6% then nominal GDP is growing at 8% pa – therefore borrowing can continue up to this level (8% of GDP) without causing the debt/GDP ratio to rise. There are concerns over SOE (State Owned Enterprises) debt but these are not new.
US stock markets are about four times as large as China’s in terms of market capitalization so China is much less vulnerable to a stock market crash. China’s banks have much lower loan to deposit ratios compared to Western banks and there are no officially authorized derivatives markets. China has major infrastructure investment – but there no evidence it is wasted. There is some evidence of overbuilding in the property sector where, for example, there are tens of millions of empty flats. However, this is not new and these flats will soon be occupied by continued migration from the countryside.
The cost of buying new housing in the major cities has become prohibitive for most workers but the Housing Provident Fund was set up to imitate the Singapore model and is based on employee/employer contributions and offers low interest mortgages. In addition, renting is becoming much more widespread in Chinese cities and is considerably cheaper than buying. Taking these two factors together there is no evidence of an imminent residential property implosion in China.
Conclusion
In my view China is much less vulnerable to a major downturn than the US as it is less exposed to speculative asset values and its high savings ratio and high rate of economic growth allows it a significant margin in the event of a crisis. It is probably due a shakeout since it has been growing continuously for decades but it’s a question of scale. This would be a limited event rather than the start of an implosion.
In the US its wealth is underpinned by speculative asset values accompanied by a low savings and investment ratio and a continuously increasing trade deficit which means it is relying on savings from the rest of the world. Its monetary base is eroded by money creation on the part of the Fed and this makes inflation difficult to control.
Thus, while the next downturn won’t be a replay of the last it will have lasting and profound consequences in the US and elsewhere but less so in East Asia.
Author

Paul Dixon
Latin Report
Paul Dixon’s focus is economics from a long term perspective.

















