﻿<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<?xml-stylesheet href="http://xml.fxstreet.com/styles/rss2.xsl" type="text/xsl" media="screen"?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://xml.fxstreet.com/styles/itemcontent.css" type="text/css" media="screen"?><rss version="2.0" xml:base="http://wwww.fxstreet.com//fundamental/market-view/research-sweden/index.xml"><channel><title>Research Sweden</title><description /><link>http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/research-sweden/</link><ttl>7</ttl><item><title>The government presents the new bank stability plan</title><link>http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/research-sweden/2008-10-20.html</link><description>• The plan consists of two main initiatives: a compulsory stability fund aimed at recapitalising troubled banks, and a voluntary guarantee facility where the government guarantees against default risk when banks/mortgage institutes refinance maturing debts. In return, the SNDO will charge a case-by-case fee. In this publication we focus on the guarantee facility as we see it as the most interesting part from a market perspective.&amp;nbsp; • The guarantee facility will be active until April 30,</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Oct 2008 16:00:47 GMT</pubDate><source url="http://www.fxstreet.com" /><category domain="http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/">http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/</category><author>danskeresearch@danskebank.com (Danske Bank A/S)</author><guid>http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/research-sweden/2008-10-20.html</guid></item><item><title>Lessons from Swedish bank crisis management1</title><link>http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/research-sweden/2008-09-30.html</link><description>This paper is a brief guide on how the Swedish bank crisis in the early 1990s was handled. It is an interesting precedent to the current predicament of the US financial sector, and there are many relevant parallels.&amp;nbsp; The bank crisis management must be said to have been successful. The bank sector was stabilised quickly once the tools were in place, and the assets bought and seized were liquidated much faster than expected.&amp;nbsp; The total direct cost incurred by the state is estimated at</description><pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 17:00:52 GMT</pubDate><source url="http://www.fxstreet.com" /><category domain="http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/">http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/</category><author>danskeresearch@danskebank.com (Danske Bank A/S)</author><guid>http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/research-sweden/2008-09-30.html</guid></item><item><title>Home Precious Home</title><link>http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/research-sweden/2008-07-09.html</link><description>• The one-off effect of the transition from an accommodative, high inflation and high interest rate monetary policy regime prior to the early 1990s to the current inflation-targeting low interest rate regime had a huge .discount factor. effect on the real estate market that has now come to an end. • High loan-to-value ratios among first-time buyers and higher interest rates combined with negative real income growth is a poisonous cocktail for the housing market. Swedish home prices could be</description><pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 16:13:26 GMT</pubDate><source url="http://www.fxstreet.com" /><category domain="http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/">http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/</category><author>danskeresearch@danskebank.com (Danske Bank A/S)</author><guid>http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/market-view/research-sweden/2008-07-09.html</guid></item></channel></rss>