Fri, Apr 18 2008, 14:25 GMT
by La Caixa Economic Research Dept.
The so-called subprime mortgage crisis began in August
last year. The origin of the problem was the granting of mortgage loans in the United States to customers with low solvency without
having carried out suitable risk controls. These mortgages were securitized and
in this way passed on to a wide range of financial agents that were scarcely
aware of the risks they were taking on. The sudden increase in default of these
products set off a crisis of confidence among financial institutions that brought
about restriction on the granting of loans, liquidity problems and heavy losses
in balance sheets. The financial upsets, which have respected neither markets
nor borders, have continued ever since.
In the United States, the increase in default and the drop
in the capital ratios of banks has meant bank credit is harder to get. In
interbank markets, where banks lend to each other, the situation has meant an
increase in interest rates. In view of the turn taken by the liquidity crisis,
which finally had become a banking crisis, the Federal Reserve, the US central bank, at its meeting on monetary
policy on March 18, decided to further cut its reference rate, this time by 75
basis points, to 2.25%. In its press release following that meeting, Fed members
underlined the sharp decline in economic activity.
Before this cut in the official rate,
the Fed adopted a series of measures aimed at easing its effects. The ultimate
aim of these measures was to increase liquidity, especially in the interbank
market and in the market for assets backed by mortgage securities.
At the beginning of March it created a new
«liquidity window» to which US investment banks that had no access to the
discount window could apply, as was the case for other deposit-taking banks.
Secondly, the Federal Reserve decided to
accept as collateral or security for that liquidity not only Treasury bonds but
also bonds issued by the federal agencies Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and even mortgage-backed
bonds issued by private companies with high credit rating.
In addition, the Fed announced an increase
in swaps with the ECB and the Swiss central bank. A swap of this kind is a
financial exchange in which the Fed puts dollars at the disposal of those two central
banks so that they may make those dollars available to European commercial
banks. In return, the Fed obtains assets in
euros.
Published on Fri, Apr 18 2008, 14:25 GMT
Thu, Nov 22 2007, 15:25 GMT
by La Caixa Economic Research Dept.
On October 9, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) published the minutes of the meeting
held on September 18 when it took the decision to lower the reference rate from
5.25% to 4.75%. The minutes reflect that a good part of the meeting was devoted
to discussing the effect of the sub-prime mortgage crisis on growth. The
members of the Fed reached two important conclusions: 1) inflationary pressures
in the United States had moderated
and did not represent any problem over the medium term and 2) the risk to the
growth scenario had increased and had moved to the central point of the
economic monitoring radar of the US central bankers.
On the other hand, following the meeting
on October 4, the governor of the European Central Bank (ECB) read his usual
comments putting the accent on inflationary risks. For the ECB this was a major
dilemma. On the one hand, due to the crisis of liquidity in the interbank
market brought about by the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States, it should
avoid raising interest rates in order not to make it worse. On the other hand,
it had to keep inflation expectations of the economic agents secure. In order
to meet this double challenge, the Governing Council took two important
decisions. First, not to raise interest rates until it had more economic
information giving it a clearer idea of the impact of the financial crisis. The
second decision was to warn that inflationary risks had increased over the medium
term and to remind people that the main objective of the ECB was price stability.
In the end, the ECB is maintaining a delicate balance. It must avoid any
increase in the risk premiums for future inflation while at the same time
baling out, that is to say, injecting the necessary liquidity to stop the ship from
capsizing.
Nevertheless, at mid-month a split could
be observed among ECB members on the question of inflation. Jean-Claude Trichet,
the governor, Axel Weber, chairman of the Bundesbank and Klaus Liebscher,
governor of the Central Bank of Austria emphasized the
risk of inflation. In turn, the governors of the central banks of Belgium and the Netherlands, Guy Queden
and Nout Wellink, respectively, put the accent on concern about growth in the
Euro Area.
For the moment, it would seem that the statements by the ECB had their effect although
only partly so. The table shows how the 3-month Euribor rate has dropped from
4.79% to 4.63%. Other short-term interest rates in Japan, Switzerland and United
Kingdom also went down. But the
decreases in the government bond interest rate in these countries hides a
situation of flight to quality. International investors have reduced their
positions in high-risk assets and have taken refuge in shortterm government
bonds with AAA rating, that is to say, free of credit risk. This may be seen
clearly in the accompanying graph where it shows the differential in interest rates for interbank deposits
and 3-month Treasury bills in the United States and the Euro
Area.
Banks lend money among themselves in the interbank market. Naturally, lending money
to another bank involves more risk than lending to the State by buying bonds it
issues. It is evident that a country’s government bonds with top credit-rating
involve a lower risk seeing that states have the power to make collections
through taxes, which private companies do not have. For this reason, in order
to compensate the higher risk they demand a higher return. Under normal
conditions in the Euro Area interbank market on the 3-month interest rate banks
require a premium of 8 basis points above the yield offered by a Treasury bill
(100 basis points equal 1%). In the United States, the
differential is approximately 20 basis points, that is 0.2%. On the other hand,
in order to obtain funds in both interbank markets, the other bank requirement
is a differential of 0.7% above 3-month Treasury bills.
The message is very clear. Banks prefer not to lend money in the market unless the
price compensates for the risk created by the uncertainty about the subprime mortgage
crisis. This situation reflects the lack of confidence currently existing in
bank markets. The financial markets have still not normalized their situation
although it is true that the interventions by the central banks have so far
helped get over what up to now has been the worst moment of this crisis since
it broke out at the beginning of summer.
Published on Thu, Nov 22 2007, 15:25 GMT
Wed, Oct 24 2007, 12:34 GMT
by La Caixa Economic Research Dept.
September brought a continuation of the sub-prime
mortgage crisis in the United States and its impact on the rest of the world
through the financial markets.
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson declared
that the crisis would be a long one. The European Commissioner for Economic and
Financial Affairs, Joaquín Almunia joined in this view when stating that the
volatility of the markets was behind the decision to lower the forecasts for
economic growth. That is to say, he recognized that the spread of the damage in
the financial markets to the real economy was indeed a fact. The interbank
market in the United States continued to rise, as may be seen in the
following graph, while the state of liquidity was being maintained. While
investors took refuge in government securities, buying US Treasury bills, the
banks reduced their positions in the interbank market and had difficulty in
issuing bonds. In the United States, for example, the outstanding balance
of notes with real security in the private fixed-income market dropped by 251.3
billion dollars in just a few weeks. On June 25 there was an outstanding
balance of 1,180 billion dollars, whereas by September 19 this had been reduced
to 930 billion dollars.
That is to say, this was paper issued by
various companies that fell due and could not be refinanced in the markets because
they were excessively expensive because of widening of loan differentials. Another
example of the problems brought about by the mortgage crisis was the pattern
followed by the British bank Northern Rock. On September 13 it announced that
it had asked for emergency funds from the Bank of England as lender of last
resort with the agreement of the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer for an amount
of 3 billion pounds sterling (4.38 billion euros). The reason for the move was
the difficulty in obtaining funds in the interbank market given that the bank
was financing more than 75% of its loan operations through that market instead
of through deposits.
After making this announcement, the bank’s
shares collapsed by 32%. In 2000, Northern Rock became part of the FTSE 100
stock exchange index which includes the 100 companies with highest capitalization
listed on the London stock exchange. In spite of having few
branches, the notable impact of its liquidity crisis in the financial system
was due to its strong development of financial innovation which allowed it to shift
risk very rapidly. On September 14, the day after the announcement, there were
long line-ups of customers wanting to withdraw all their savings. In two days the
bank had lost 2 billion pounds sterling. On September 17, the share price again
plummeted by 35% going from 438 pennies to 283 pennies. That day, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the British government and the Bank
of England would guarantee all the deposits of Northern Rock without any limit.
Published on Wed, Oct 24 2007, 12:34 GMT
Mon, Oct 8 2007, 12:09 GMT
by La Caixa Economic Research Dept.
August 2007 will go down in financial history because of the crisis in the US sub-prime mortgage market.What makes up such an asset? How has the «contamination» process worked? Subprime mortgages are mortgages granted to customers of poor solvency and which therefore present greater risk of default than those to «normal» customers. These mortgages are thus qualified when they are granted to persons with a problem credit history or to those unable to provide all the necessary documents (proof of income sources, for example) or in those cases where the amount of the mortgage represents a very high percentage of the price of the home being financed (more than 85%) or the monthly payment represents more than 55% of available earnings, etc. As they are more risky, sub-prime mortgages usually carry a higher interest rate. Normally, customers often pay a differential of between 2% and 3% more than the rate on a standard or prime mortgage.
At this time, the US mortgage market amounts to 10,000 billion dollars, of which sub-prime mortgages represent 13% of the total market and 9% of nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States. A priori, it does not seem that its economic importance should place the liquidity of the US banking system in jeopardy. Nevertheless, two factors have heightened the damaging effects of the increase in default of these assets. Before going into an explanation of this «contamination», however, we should find out who holds these assets in their investment portfolios.
Most of these sub-prime mortgage loans are granted by financial institutions that are not deposit-taking entities and therefore are subject to lower regulatory and supervision requirements compared with those for other banks and deposit institutions. Once the customer uses the loan to buy a house, the debt is noted in the balance sheet of the institution granting the loan. However, in order to boost their business, these institutions relieve themselves of these mortgages and sell them to commercial banks or investment banks.
The new holders, in turn, package the mortgages in blocks and issue securitization bonds (CDO, or Collateralized Debt Obligations) using the sub-prime mortgages as security or collateral. That is to say, based on subprime mortgages, they create a new kind of asset that is more easily negotiable in the markets and it is this bond that carries the risk in the operation. To the extent that the holders of the mortgages keep paying off their debt every month, these funds are used to pay those who have bought these bonds. Those buying CDO are usually investment funds, insurance companies, liquid asset holders, traders, etc. who obtain higher yields from these assets than the market average although, naturally, running greater risk. This new product is broken down according to the credit risk assumed and a qualification or credit rating is assigned by the rating agencies. What credit risk does the buyer of these products take on? It is very simple. The security of the product goes back to the sub-prime mortgage. If a customer fails to pay off a mortgage, the losses shift to the holder of the loan or to the bondholder at the end of the risk chain. Finally, through securitization the sub-prime mortgages have been removed from the liabilities column in the balance sheet of the entity granting the original loan, having been transferred to the institutional customers mentioned above (investment funds, treasury departments of banks, insurance companies, etc.).
If the amount of the sub-prime mortgages represents a small percentage and the risk is spread widely, that is to say, finally distributed among markets operators, how do we explain that the crisis ends up «contaminating» other assets? As we suggested earlier, there have been two key factors, namely, high liquidity and financial leverage. For a number of years, the world financial system has been swimming in a sea of liquidity with a range of resulting factors (expansionist monetary policies, low inflation, development of new technology for managing risk, etc.). In order to correct this situation, the central banks in the main economies moved into a stage of interest rate increases in the face of fear of a speculative bubble linked to real estate assets and raw materials.
A number of factors have come together to bring about the sub-prime mortgage financial crisis in the United States. First, the sharp increase in mortgage interest rates (200 basis points in 2 years).What is more, the real estate sector went into recession in January 2006 with a decrease in the number of housing units sold and a drop in prices. In addition, there was a slight economic slowdown and, finally, an easing of conditions for granting sub-prime mortgage loans, especially in 2005 and 2006. These elements have brought about an increase in mortgage default.
Institutional customers (especially hedge funds), which invested in this type of product, taking advantage of this opportunity for low-cost funding because of their high liquidity, and the possibility of using the carry trade (transactions involving borrowing in low-interest rate currencies offering high return), combined this with high leverage in order to increase yield. That is to say, funds borrowed money using fund assets as collateral in order to increase their investments in the same assets through complex derivatives. They thus heightened the concentration of risk using money from the fund to buy bonds for which the collateral was high-risk mortgages, borrowing in order to buy more bonds of the same type.
Published on Mon, Oct 8 2007, 12:09 GMT
Thu, Jun 7 2007, 09:59 GMT
by Economic Research Dept.
As expected, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to maintain its reference rates stable at its meeting on April 12. Nevertheless, in its analysis of the economic and financial situation it recognized that there continued to be upward risks for inflation. In fact, harmonized inflation for the euro area rose to 1.9%, close to the limit set by the ECB. At the same time, the broad money supply figure for the euro area, the socalled M3, recorded annual growth of 10.0% in February, the highest level since the introduction of the euro,more than twice the reference growth rate set by the ECB.
In this context, chairman Jean-Claude Trichet mentioned that interest rates were still at a moderate level and he suggested that a new tightening of the monetary policy screw was near and likely would take place at the beginning of June. This prospect does not please everyone and the representative of a well-known European business lobby launched warnings against any increases above the 4% level. Nevertheless, it would not be surprising if this takes place in the second half-year.
On the other side of the English Channel, current legislation obliged the governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, to write to the minister of economy, Gordon Brown, explaining the reasons for a deviation in inflation of more than one percentage point from the 2% established, as well as the measure he proposed to take to correct the rise in prices. This is the first time this has happened in the nearly ten years that the British central bank has been independent. The governor of the central bank recognized that there had been the conditions for companies to try to raise their profit margins, which had been squeezed as a result of the last rise in oil prices. King expressed his determination to put inflation at 2% which he felt he could do toward the end of the year, although he indicated there were some upward risks. In these circumstances, there were renewed forecasts of a further increase in Bank of England reference rates at the next meeting in May, which would put it at 5.50% and that this would not be the last increase.
The US Federal Reserve, in turn, had no meeting planned for its monetary policy committee in April. Statements by Ben Bernanke in recent weeks, along with the latest minutes released, have reaffirmed his concern about inflation and, to a lesser degree, about growth. As a result, we maintain our predictions of stability for upcoming meetings which, however, could lead to a downward adjustment in the last four months of the year.
On the other side of the Pacific, the governor of the Bank of Japan, Toshiniko Fukui, stated before parliament that Japan’s monetary conditions continued to be very easy and indicated a gradual course of increases in interest rates. Nevertheless, we did not believe that the next increase would take place at the meeting on April 27 but that it would likely be in the summer.
On the other hand, more to the south of the Asian continent there were indeed new moves. At the end of March, the Bank of India announced an increase of 25 basis points in its invention rate putting it at 7.75%, thus continuing the upturn begun in September 2004. At the same time, it raised the cash ratio by a half-point to 6.50%. These measure are aimed at dealing with inflationary trends in an economy with signs of overheating, such as an annual inflation rate of 7.6%, according to the industrial workers’ index, and annual growth of credit at 29.5% in an environment of optimism reflected, in another sphere, the euphoria recently set off by the lavish wedding of two Bollywood film stars, Abhishek Bachchan and Aishwarya Rai, a former Miss World. Given the slow rate of needed structural reforms, new restrictive moves in monetary policy are likely in order to cool off the economy.
Published on Thu, Jun 7 2007, 09:59 GMT
Wed, May 2 2007, 14:49 GMT
by Economic Research Dept.
As expected, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) raised its reference rates by 25 basis points at its meeting on March 8. The Eurosystem interest rate thus went to 3.75% following seven increases since the upturn began in December 2005. This decision was justified by the persistence of upward inflationary risks. Following the trend, underlying inflation in February rose to 1.9%, the highest level since the end of 2004. At the same time, the broad M3 money supply figure continued to rise at a sharp rate, namely 9.8% year-to-year in January.
The new macroeconomic projections of the ECB experts have put growth of the euro area gross domestic product at 2.5% in 2007 and 2.4% in 2008, which is an upward revision compared with December. For inflation, the projections stand at around 1.8% in 2007 and 2.0% in 2008. This scenario suggests some inflationary risks.
Jean-Claude Trichet, chairman of the ECB, termed the current level of interest rates as moderate, leaving out the term «low». Nevertheless, he left the impression that the level was still not adequate. It is thus likely there will be a further rise in the official ECB rate putting it closer to the neutral level. It is probable that the rate for main financing transactions of the ECB will go up to 4% in June.
Nor has the US Federal Reserve substantially changed its position. At its meeting on March 21 it made no change in the objective level of Federal Funds, the overnight interbank rate, which has stood at 5.25% since June. The press release issued after the meeting indicated some easing of the upward bias. Indeed, the markets are rather betting on decreases. In fact, the recent instability in financial markets, linked to doubts about the trend in the US economy, suggests a sharpening of these expectations. The repeated pessimistic comments of the former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan has strengthened this view. (Greenspan has estimated the chances that the US economy would go into recession this year at one out of three.) Nevertheless, Ben Bernanke, the current president, has taken a more optimistic position and made some statements designed to calm down the market.
Other central banks have raised their official interest rates, including New Zealand, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland. At the end of the third week of March, the Bank of China raised its rate on 1-year loans and deposits by 27 basis points to 6.39% and 2.79% respectively in view of inflationary pressures. The Bank of Brazil continued to ease monetary conditions with a further cut of 25 basis points in the second week of March putting the reference rate at 12.75%.
Published on Wed, May 2 2007, 14:49 GMT
Wed, Apr 4 2007, 09:23 GMT
by Economic Research Dept.
The Bank of Japan finally decided to raise its interest rates in the third week of February. After confusing the markets in January when nearly all operators were expecting a rise, this time the Japanese monetary authority stopped vacillating and declared an increase of 25 basis points in its reference rate putting it at 0.50%. This was the second upward move since it began its restrictive turn in July 2006. The argument given by the Japanese central bank was the good macroeconomic results in the fourth quarter published a few days beforehand.While it is true that inflation scarcely exists, the monetary authority believes that the economy will continue to grow at a moderate rate. The central bank chose a gradual path for raising its interest rates so that the official rate will probably stay at 0.50% for some months.
The same thing will likely happen in the United States where no changes are expected in coming months. The message given out by the US monetary authority is to maintain the objective of the overnight interbank rate at 5.25%, a level resulting from the balance between the improvement in the economic situation and the problems affecting the real estate market. In his appearance before a Congress committee in midFebruary, Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated that inflation was tending to drop but indicated that the Fed would maintain an upward bias in monetary policy, that is, over the long term they could end up raising the interest rate.
British rates also point to a rise. On February 8, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England decided to maintain the official interest rate at 5.25%. In contrast to its meeting in January, when the increase in the interest rate caught the markets unprepared, this was no surprise and later on prospects of further increases somewhat cooled off. Nevertheless, as expected by the market, some rise is likely in coming months in order to contain inflationary pressures.
At its meeting in the second week of February, the European Central Bank (ECB) did not modify its reference rate level but left it at 3.50%. Chairman Trichet, however, repeated that the level of interest rates was still low and that monetary policy was easy and pointed to a further rise in reference rates in March. While the rise in crude oil prices in recent years has not had significant passthrough effects, the ECB expressed its concern about the outcome of wage negotiations underway. Given that the European economy seems to keep growing more than expected, it is possible that the rise in March will not be the last in this round.With this rise the reference rate could go to 4%, a point closer to the neutral level.
The institution that did decide to act once more was the central bank of India, that was alarmed by signs of overheating of the economy. At the end of January, among other restraints on monetary policy, it decided to raise the repo rate by 25 basis points to 7.5%. The Indian economy is growing more than expected and the central bank raised its own growth projections for the year ending March 2007 to 8.5%-9%, which increases inflation risks. In addition, in mid- February the Bank of Sweden again raised its reference rate by 25 basis points to 3.25% bringing it close to the euro area level.
Published on Wed, Apr 4 2007, 09:23 GMT
Fri, Mar 2 2007, 11:32 GMT
by Economic Research Dept.
The international money supply continues abundant and, in spite of the recent drop in oil prices, the upward stage in interest rates is still being maintained in view of inflationary risks.
This would seem to be confirmed by the recent increase in official interest rate by the Bank of England which probably will not be its last this year.
On January 11, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England decided to raise its reference rate by 25 basis points putting it at 5.25%. This was the third increase since August and it caught most of the market by surprise seeing that, although further increases had been discounted, they were expected to come later. The British monetary authorities justified the measure because of the increase in inflationary risks, given the limited margin in utilization of production capacity. In fact, just a few days later, the figure for inflation of consumer prices in December was published showing an increase of 3.0%, substantially above the 2% objective which explained the central bank’s concern.
On the other hand, on the same day the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to maintain the Eurosystem interest rate at 3.50%. Although no change was expected, the less belligerent tone adopted by chairman Jean-Claude Trichet at the following press conference was somewhat surprising.As a result, doubts that existed about whether the next increase would be in February were resolved in favour of a further rise in March.
In fact, the relatively low current level of the official ECB interest rate, the run-away growth of the broad M3 money supply figure (with a year-to-year change of 9.7% in December, the highest since 1999) and some risks for increased inflation point to further tightening of monetary control.
Nevertheless, if we take into account that the euro has appreciated substantially in recent years, monetary conditions would suggest that there is not much further up to go, so that the level reached by the Eurosystem interest rate will possibly stand at 4% in coming months.
In addition, the market had clearly discounted the new increase in the official interest rate by the Bank of Japan at the monetary meeting held on December 18. Nevertheless, in the end political pressure possibly prevailed and the Japanese monetary authorities made no move, leaving the reference rate at 0.25%, the vote in favour being 6 to 3. It is true that the situation of the Japanese economy is not without its good and bad features as shown, for example, in a very modest growth in bank credit, although what is most likely is that the gradual normalization of Japanese interest rates has only been postponed.
With regard to the US Federal Reserve, we could not expect changes at its meeting at the end of January. In fact, the objective level of the interest rate on US 1-day interbank deposits will probably continue at 5.25% for some months, given that the Fed is caught between fear of a sharp slowdown in the economy and the danger of inflation shown, for example, in the recent rise of industrial and consumer prices.
Published on Fri, Mar 2 2007, 11:32 GMT
Thu, Jun 22 2006, 10:08 GMT
by Economic Research Dept.
Published on Thu, Jun 22 2006, 05:08 GMT
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