Tue, Jun 24 2008, 14:27 GMT
by Mark Vitner
Charlotte is one of only a handful of medium-sized metropolitan areas to break into the ranks of first tier markets during the past decade. Solid population growth, a well diversified economy, generally good governance and an enviable quality of life have moved Charlotte forward. The metro area is often ranked as one of the best places to do business, raise a family, find a job, or start a new company. Most recently, Charlotte attracted a great deal of attention for being the lone metro area in the S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Home Price Index to post a year-to-year increase.
Published on Tue, Jun 24 2008, 14:27 GMT
Wed, Apr 23 2008, 13:56 GMT
by John Silvia
Both employment and personal income are showing the stress of the recession. Over the first quarter both series have fallen far below their trend values. This suggests continued weakness in the overall economy through the current quarter and below par growth in the second half of the year. Still too early to make the recovery call.
Published on Wed, Apr 23 2008, 13:56 GMT
Tue, Oct 23 2007, 15:32 GMT
by John Silvia
Five economic fundamentals provide the framework for any proper economic baseline for the year ahead. These short run, business cycle fundamentals are growth, inflation, interest rates, corporate profits and the dollar. In addition, strategic planning must also account for longer run behaviors. This discussion therefore takes a peak at key long run influences such as demographics, education and global growth.∗
Slower Growth but No Recession
Discerning between slower growth and recessions (negative growth) requires a more nuanced examination of economic trends. In Figure 1, next page, the slower pace of economic growth is evident in the year-over-year growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP). There remains a significant difference, however, between current activity and the experience of 2000-2002. Over the last few months, the worst fears about the near-term economic outlook subsided considerably following the release of the September employment figures, manufacturing surveys and retail sales. Job gains were stronger than expected in September while the August decline in jobs was revised to a modest gain. The ISM manufacturing survey and retail sales numbers suggest continued growth. For the intermediate term, we will get our first look at third quarter real GDP on October 31. Our latest estimate has third quarter real GDP rising at around a 3.5 percent pace and there is a good chance that growth will come in above our estimate. Any recession talk is contradicted by two reliable indicators of growth. First, jobless claims, which come out every Thursday morning, remain in the positive growth range of 310,000 to 330,000 on a four week moving average basis. Second, the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) index remains in the positive growth range of 52 to 54 percent, where 50 is considered break even. The ISM indicator subcomponents of production, new orders and supplier deliveries remain above the 50 break even level.
Recent economic strength reflects the impact of robust consumer outlays during the quarter as well as strength in non-residential construction, government and trade sectors. Consumer spending is being helped by income and labor market fundamentals. Household net worth has benefited from gains in equity markets. Meanwhile, labor market improvements have slowed in terms of actual job gains, to a pace slightly below what is necessary to hold the unemployment rate steady. However, labor compensation has improved along with continued low inflation. Real household incomes have continued to improve enough to sustain a positive trend in real income. Looking ahead, spending for big-ticket items such as automobiles and household furniture is expected to slow in coming quarters, as adjustable rate mortgages reset upward. Slower job and income growth will also curb consumers’ willingness to spend this holiday season. The outlook is for slower growth but growth nonetheless.
Longer Term Influences on Growth and the Strategic Vision
Over the last forty years there has been a consistent shift in population growth from the Northeast and Midwest to the South and the West as evidenced in Figure 2. This pattern reflects the fundamentals of the cost of land, labor, and personal income taxes and, over the last two decades, the rising tide of retirees living in the South and West. This population shift drives the top line revenue growth for community banking.
These same trends should hold over the next 15 years according to the U.S. Census bureau (Figure 3, next page). The upper Midwest and the Northeast will continue to shed population, as baby boomer retirees and job seekers alike seek opportunities in the Sunbelt and the West.
Another demographic trend has been the rising returns to education. Mean family income data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finance (Figure 4) shows that income growth for high school graduates and those that fail to graduate is far slower compared to those who even obtain some college education. This suggests that banks will increasingly benefit from rising income/educated households as a source of deposits and credit quality loans in the years ahead.
Gains in Capital Spending, Non-Residential Construction—Housing Correction Continues
Over the last year we have witnessed strength in business equipment spending for information processing and software equipment while other capital spending has slowed sharply. Strength for spending in the information economy appears to be a secular story. Global competition compels competitors to invest to compete effectively.
Meanwhile, non-residential construction has been solid for the last six quarters (Figure 5). Lending for takeovers and sales of commercial real estate properties will now be more prudent and based on much more conservative assumptions of future revenues. Prices of commercial properties may fall back a bit as well, but commercial construction should be restrained only modestly, as office vacancy rates remain relatively low across the country and rents are increasing. A repeat of the second quarter’s solid 26 percent annualized gain in structures spending is unlikely anytime soon, but a sharp downturn is just as improbable.
Residential housing spending continued to weaken during the year. Now that conditions in the credit markets appear to have stabilized somewhat, we have a better, but still uncertain, idea of the potential impact. Credit is being constrained for riskier borrowers and will likely remain tight. Some loosening in the sub-prime market will eventually occur, particularly for fixed-rate mortgages, where credit quality remains relatively good. Our view is that real residential investment will be less of a drag on growth in the year ahead (Figure 6).
Inflation: Within Fed’s Target Range but Limited Further Progress
While inflation data suggest that the core personal consumption deflator (Figure 7) remains in the top end of the Federal Reserve’s range, further progress does not appear to be in tow. Core producer prices are up 2.2 percent over the last year as of August 2007 compared to a mere 1.2 percent reading a year ago. Meanwhile, the ISM prices-paid index came in at 59.0 compared to a peak of 73 in April where 50 is the breakeven point between rising and falling prices paid. The prices paid index has been above 50 all this year. Finally, productivity growth has slowed and we witnessed a rise in unit labor costs of 5.1 percent in the second quarter. Unit labor costs have climbed since 2004, the bottom of the recent cycle.
While higher gasoline prices remain a risk, there is a growing probability that most of the damage is behind us. We are beginning to see some moderation in housing costs, which should also help to contain core inflation. The core PCE deflator should remain near the top-half of the Fed’s comfort zone.
Fed Takes a Wait and See Attitude
From mid-2004 to early 2006 the Fed has followed a policy of getting the funds rate back to “neutral’ and then keeping the funds rate steady for over a year (Figure 8). Longer-term, however, we suspect the Fed remains cautious on the inflation outlook and is unlikely to ease very much despite the current set of economic numbers. As for inflation over the last few quarters, we have seen a steady rise in unit labor costs along with steady gains in the core finished goods component of the producer price index. These developments suggest the Fed will take its time to ease. The minutes from the latest FOMC meeting contained one surprise in that the Fed decided not to provide a balance of risks assessment. We interpret this move as an attempt by the Fed to make it clear to the financial markets that they can react to a financial crisis without giving in on inflation. Carried a step further, the Fed’s comments seem to indicate to us that September’s half point rate cut and any additional cuts we might see are intended to provide a temporary respite for the economy and financial markets. Interest rates will climb once the economy and financial markets firm up.
We now have the Fed on hold, with a bias to ease, through all of next year. With real GDP growth expected to be around a two percent pace for the next two quarters, there is a risk that some sort of exogenous shock coming from the financial markets or overseas will trigger some additional moves by the Fed. Any such moves would come after the October 31 FOMC meeting, when the economy is likely to look pretty solid. Current Fed policy inaction appears primarily designed to prevent the problems in the sub-prime mortgage market from spilling over into other parts of the economy. The Fed will also likely remain alert to taking further steps to restore liquidity to credit markets, especially the asset-backed commercial paper market, possibly by reducing the discount rate further and broadening the rules on what can be pledged as collateral at the discount window. Rising LIBOR rates (Figure 9) suggest bank credit quality concerns still exist in the private sector and may point to similar anxiety at the Fed as well. This credit restraint will impact the availability and supply of credit in the coming year.
Up to this point inter-bank credit tightening has not filtered down to the commercial lending segment, as it appears credit quality in the private, non-mortgage, sector continues to be solid. Credit card delinquency rates have increased modestly but remain much lower than that experienced during the last recession. Meanwhile, auto loan delinquency rates remain low relative to their performance over the past decade. Finally, credit supply does not appear to be severely constrained. As illustrated in Figure 10, the percentage of banks tightening credit standards on commercial and industrial (C&I) loans remains far below the credit restraint level associated with the 2001 recession.
Corporate Profits; Slower Growth
While growth has slowed for corporate profits, it remains fairly solid for this stage of the business cycle. After a few years of recovery, the typical economic expansion goes through a period of slower top line revenue growth accompanied by rising input costs. From our discussion of growth above we note that aggregate economic growth is slowing in the economy. On the cost side, there has been a rising trend in unit labor costs as illustrated in Figure 11. Rising unit labor costs are the product of the combination of slowing productivity gains (also shown in Figure 11) and rising compensation to labor. This rising compensation reflects the increasing shortage of skilled labor that occurs as the economic expansion moves ahead.
A new twist during this economic expansion is the boost to profits of major multinationals with large international operations that occurs when the dollar depreciates relative to key foreign currencies. In this case, multinational companies headquartered in the U.S. earn higher valued dollar returns when those returns are earned in currencies such as the euro and Canadian dollar that are appreciating relative to the U.S. dollar. This complicates the picture for calculating the dollar’s effect on overall corporate profit growth.
Dollar: Losing Ground
When benchmarked by the Fed’s “Major Currency” index, which measures the dollar’s value against seven major foreign currencies, the dollar continues to lose ground (Figure 12). Looking forward, we project further dollar depreciation in the quarters ahead. Why? For starters, the current account deficit, although beginning to narrow a bit, should remain “large” for some time. Second, interest rate differentials between the United States and most major foreign countries are not very supportive for the greenback at present. U. S. interest rates are likely to remain stable or decline slightly. Euro rates are likely to remain stable for some time.
In addition, recent dislocations in credit markets, which should keep new issuance of structured fixed income products depressed for some time, will give foreign investors fewer U.S. securities to purchase, which will weigh on net capital inflows. The dollar decline last month after the Federal Reserve cut its target for the fed funds rate by 50 basis points. Not only did the larger-than-expected reduction in the Fed’s policy rate cause short-term U.S. interest rates to decline, which reduced the relative attractiveness of U.S. assets, but it also stoked expectations of further Fed easing.
Capital Inflows and the Depreciating Currency
One risk to the outlook that we should recognize is the delicate balance between foreign investor’s willingness to purchase U.S. assets (Figure 13) and the risk of currency loss on those assets. Since net capital inflows to the U.S. (demand for dollars) continue to fall short of the current account deficit (supply of dollars) this exerts downward pressure on the dollar. To the extent foreign investors anticipate continued future dollar depreciation, the risk to U.S. capital markets is that interest rates will rise to compensate foreign investors for the currency losses. This pattern of weaker dollar, higher rates and an aversion to U.S. assets remains a risk but we do not expect a dollar meltdown to take place, i.e., foreign investors dumping their holdings of U.S. assets on a large-scale basis.
Our capital markets remain the broadest, most liquid, and most transparent capital markets in the world, and we do not expect foreign investors to lose all faith in the ability of U.S. consumers, businesses, and government to honor their financial obligations on a widespread basis. In our view, the probability of a complete meltdown in the value of the greenback is rather low. Notwithstanding the possibility of a near-term dollar correction, the most likely scenario is for the greenback to continue to depreciate at a modest pace over the foreseeable future.
Published on Tue, Oct 23 2007, 15:32 GMT
Mon, Oct 22 2007, 11:06 GMT
by Adam York, Mark Vitner
When you think of California’s economy today one of the first thoughts to come to mind is the collapsing housing market. California was one of the biggest participants in the housing boom and is now seeing the backside of that. Home sales are plummeting and prices are falling in many metro areas. The broader economy is assumed to be following the same route. Fortunately, it is not. Overall job growth is holding up relatively well and the Golden State’s Gross Domestic Product is still expanding. We estimate that California’s real GDP grew at a 2.8 percent annual rate during the third quarter and rose 3.7 percent over the past year.
Not only has overall growth held up relatively well to date but we expect the economy to continue to post solid gains over the next couple of years. This is not to say that the sharp reduction in new home construction will not have an impact. It most certainly has and will continue to do so. Employment in construction is currently off 2.6 percent over the past year and expected to fall further. Employment in related industries, including mortgage finance, is also weakening. Several other areas, including health care, education, leisure and hospitality, and wholesale trade and distribution, continue to do quite well. Defense, aerospace and the state’s key technology sectors also continue to expand.
The problems in mortgage finance are disproportionably affecting the California labor market. Nearly forty percent of recent layoffs were in credit intermediation and related activities. Through August, California has reported 42 percent more initial claims for unemployment insurance in the industry than in all of 2006. Obviously, credit market turmoil continued into September and we would expect the mass layoffs to get worse before they get better.
On a relative basis, the strongest job growth continues to be in the Inland Empire. Hiring is being driven by the burgeoning foreign trade sector. San Francisco and the greater Bay area, on the other hand, have taken much longer to recover from the last recession. San Francisco lost nearly ten percent of its nonfarm jobs in the three years including and following the 2001 recession, which hit the IT sector particularly hard. Sacramento saw the second strongest rate of improvement following the recession but hiring has slowed more recently, reflecting the relatively sharp contraction in homebuilding and mortgage finance currently taking place there.
The inventory overhang in California housing is severe at this point and has shown no signs of declining in the near-term. While the months’ supply of existing homes for sale has not reached the highs of the early 1990s after the last California housing bust, the pace of assent has them rapidly approaching those levels. The massive inventory overhang and California’s low affordability leads us to believe that activity on new homes will have to decline further from their already depressed levels and prices may have to decline substantially in order for balance to be restored in the market.
Prices will fall in both nominal and real terms. We are expecting about a 16 percent nominal drop over the next three years. The OFHEO price data that we use to trace California’s home prices excludes most homes with Subprime and Jumbo mortgages. Once these homes are included, price declines will prove to be far more severe. Unfortunately, there is no statewide price index that incorporates this data.
California’s economy will continue to lose momentum as the housing bust unfolds. The slowest period of economic activity will likely occur between now and the middle of 2008. This period should see the bulk of the cutbacks in residential construction and related industries, such as mortgage banking. Rising foreclosures will result in larger price declines during the coming year. California will likely see prices decline in nominal terms for at least the next couple of years and in real terms a few years beyond that.
The weakness in the housing market is impacting consumer spending. Sales of motor vehicles have weakened much more in California than they have in the rest of the country. Sales are also off sharply at furniture stores and home improvement centers. Despite these declines, overall retail sales are still growing, reflecting solid income gains and a growth in tourism.
Once home construction bottoms out, economic growth will gradually pick back up, reflecting solid gains in international trade and the state’s large high technology sectors. We should see more balanced growth toward the end of the decade, with growth in business fixed investment helping drive output in the state’s IT equipment and software industries. The growing interest in green technologies is rapidly emerging as another key competitive advantage for California and could contribute meaningfully to growth in coming years.
While we expect conditions to gradually improve, the economic environment remains extremely challenging in California. High housing costs and rising energy bills are nudging many businesses and residents to neighboring states and, increasingly, to points even further out. Overall population growth has slowed significantly and will likely remain sluggish over the next few years. Slower population growth means that it will take longer to clear out the excess inventories of new homes currently on the market. A correction is underway, however, and we believe that the most painful part will be in the next few quarters.
Labor Market Has Weakened in Recent Months
California’s labor market has shown some weakness in recent months with nonfarm employment slowing to just 0.3 percent pace over the past three months. The deceleration reflects cutbacks in residential construction and mortgage finance, as well as an increasing reluctance by businesses to add staff.
California’s unemployment rate clearly bottomed in late 2006 and has risen 0.9 percentage points as the state economy took the brunt of the housing downturn and subprime mortgage market collapse in quick succession. Layoffs and job losses in both the construction and financial activities sectors are not over yet. Construction activity is still winding down throughout the state and we should see job losses accelerate later this year and early 2008. Layoffs in the financial sector took off in August and September and will take some time to work into the reported employment figures.
Coincident Index Indicates Moderate but Continued Growth
The coincident index has moderated in recent month, but is still growing solidly, climbing 2.8 percent over the past year. California’s economy has clearly experienced strong headwinds from the housing slump and more recently the mortgage market. Despite these problems the state is poised for moderate but continued growth. Population growth has slowed in recent years, but the state still added close to 300,000 people in 2006, the last year a Census estimate is available. The lack of affordable housing and a generally high cost of living continue to impede population growth.
Manufacturing exports slowed in the second quarter to just over $29 billion but remain near their recent highs. U.S. export strength on the whole should continue with a weaker dollar and strong growth abroad, as a result we would expect California’s exports will find the same favorable conditions in world markets.
Permits Are Off Sharply Since the Cycle Highs
Permits for new single family homes across the state are off sharply, down 34 percent in the last year and nearly two-thirds since the peak of the housing market. Single family permits are reaching levels not seen in more than a decade, as a severe inventory overhang plagues the California market. California housing has had and continues to have an affordability problem. While the premium that California’s home prices sell at relative to the nation using the OFHEO index averaged 11 percent between 1982 and 1998, the premium now stands at over 55 percent. Clearly this gap will need to close, at least modestly before housing will recover in the state. This convergence does not have to entirely be made of price declines in California, though we think double digit declines over the next few quarters are likely. Some of the correction will also come from slower price appreciation that the rest of the country in the out years.
Los Angeles
Riverside
San Francisco
Sacramento
San Diego
Published on Mon, Oct 22 2007, 11:06 GMT
Tue, Oct 16 2007, 06:34 GMT
by Adam York, Mark Vitner
The recent turmoil in the mortgage market and near shutdown of the subprime lending market is further restricting the supply of qualified homebuyers. Recent months have seen the secondary market for subprime and nontraditional mortgages dry-up. It is nearly impossible today to sell subprime loans, stated income loans, interest-only loans, and even high quality jumbo loans into the secondary market. As a result, terms on such loans have tightened considerably.
Tighter lending standards are making it considerably tougher for potential homebuyers to qualify for a mortgage. Banks generally reported falling demand for all types of mortgages, with the sharpest drop occurring in subprime loans. With lending standards remaining tight, we have again lowered our forecast for both new and existing home sales. Sales of new homes are now expected to plunge nearly 22 percent this year, while sales of existing homes should decline 11 percent. While these drops are dramatic, it is important to remember that most of this decline has already occurred. The bulk of the correction in the housing sector is behind us.
The meltdown in the secondary mortgage market makes forecasting home sales particularly difficult. Delinquencies and defaults typically take a while to show up and probably will not top out for several more quarters. Tighter lending standards in recent months mean that credit quality and delinquencies will most likely be the worst for mortgages originated in late 2005 and early 2006. This still means that any noticeable improvement in credit conditions is, at a minimum, a few quarters away.
We have long noted that many of the problems currently plaguing the housing market can be traced back to the huge role speculators played in the housing market back in 2004, 2005 and early 2006. Speculators made demand appear much stronger than it actually was from a fundamental standpoint. The added push from speculators drove prices up to levels that priced out many buyers in California, Arizona, Nevada, the greater Washington D.C. area and areas around New York City. While these markets had the greatest speculative excesses, investors and speculators were active in markets all across the country.
What needs to happen now is for prices of new and existing homes to adjust back to levels where families earning the median household income can once again afford to buy a wide assortment of homes, particularly in Florida, Nevada and California. Price declines in these markets are likely to be fairly significant in coming quarters. For the rest of the country, price adjustments will be far more modest and most areas will simply see price appreciation slow rather than endure outright price declines.
Starts of single-family homes will likely fall sharply in coming months, as builders respond to tighter credit conditions. We still see home construction bottoming in the coming year, however, as sharp adjustments in new construction have already occurred in the parts of the country that face the greatest oversupply. After tumbling 28 percent this year, we expect starts of new single-family homes to fall an additional 11 percent in 2008. More drastic reductions simply are not needed, as most of the reduction in new home construction has been in markets where overbuilding and speculative buying were the worst.
Construction of apartments is actually picking up slightly, which should offset some of the slowing we expect in the condominium market. In total, starts of multi-family projects, which includes apartments, condominiums and town homes, are expected to be unchanged in the coming year.
For the second year in a row, sales of new homes will not fall nearly as much as construction will, which will help eat away at the oversupply of homes on the market. We expect sales of new single-family homes to fall 6.0 percent in 2008, following an 11 percent drop this past year. Sales of existing homes are expected to decline 7.9 percent. Builders will need to clear out their own inventories before inventories of recently built existing homes will begin to clear. From a national standpoint, we expect the supply and demand of housing to be roughly in balance by the end of the year, which should allow for some modest improvement in both sales and new construction in 2009.
Applications Bounce and Level-off
Applications may have received some lift in recent months from tighter lending standards, as many applicants are filling out more applications looking for a willing lender. The increase in multiple application files makes it a bit more difficult to gauge actual demand for mortgages.
Applications for adjustable rate mortgages have cooled off considerably. Part of the decline simply reflects the small gap that currently exists between fixed rate and adjustable rate mortgages. Lenders are also curbing their offerings of adjustable rate products, shedding many of the more exotic mortgage products.
Affordability Hit Hard by Rising Mortgage Rates
Affordability is still stretched in many parts of country. Sales in areas where prices rose the fastest, such as Florida and California, are currently seeing some of the largest declines. Home prices are beginning to correct and job and income growth remain solid. Affordability has risen slightly from its lows. Unfortunately, rising mortgage rates are cutting into this improvement, and tighter lending standards are another problem. The interest rate on jumbo mortgages has also risen, which is compounding the problem in higher priced and second-home markets. The cost and availability of insurance is another limiting issue for many coastal markets.
Starts Fall Further on Credit Woes
Recent credit woes have sent housing on another downswing. The impact on starts will be more muted than some are expecting as most builders are now ramping down production as fast as they can. Inventories are still too high, however, particularly in Florida, northern Virginia, Arizona, Nevada and parts of California. There are also some bright spots, including Houston, Charlotte, Raleigh, Nashville, and Austin in the South, and Seattle and Portland in the West. While we still expect starts to fall further in coming months, we should see a bottom by the middle of next year.
Permits Reach Multi-year Lows
Declines in permits are beginning to show improvements in year-over-year change figures do to lower comps in late 2006. These improvements should give little comfort to investors, except to note permits are approaching a definitive floor in some of the hardest hit markets. Several states have seen extremely large declines. Florida has seen permits tumble 43 percent over the past year and 68 percent from their cyclical peak. In Nevada, permits are down 49 percent year to year and 71.5 percent from their peak. Permits for new homes in California are off 34 percent over the past year and 66 percent from their peak. How much further can they fall?
New Home Sales Retrace Bounce and Then Some
New homes sales reached a new business cycle low in August, as credit concerns and market volatility weighed on the minds of consumers. The drop in sales likely does not capture the extent of how much demand has weakened. The new home sales figures do not take cancellations into account, and cancellations soared in August, as tighter credit conditions made it tougher for would-be homebuyers to qualify for a mortgage. Fortunately, inventories are now falling and should continue to retreat over the next few years, as housing completions are now steadily declining. We expect to see considerable improvement in inventories over the course of 2008.
Existing Home Sales Continue Slide
Since rising early this year, existing home sales haven fallen back almost 18 percent and we would expect these declines to continue for several more months. We do not expect existing home sales to bottom out until late spring at the earliest.
Existing home inventories remain high and part of this glut reflects new homes purchased by speculators that had expected to flip them before construction was completed. Many investors are unable to cut prices much from current levels while builders can cut their prices on competing homes or add amenities, which is one reason existing home inventories remain high and prices remain sticky.
Price Indices Still Show Split Opinion
The OFHEO index, our preferred measure of housing prices, continues to show positive appreciation, year over year. Eighty-percent of the U.S. population, covered by the survey, lives in a metro area where prices are up, year over year. We think this indicates less of a wealth effect on spending than some are forecasting in coming quarters. The S&P/Case-Schiller Index of 20 major markets shows a more severe decline, with overall prices falling 3.9 percent over the past year. With the exception of Detroit, the largest price declines are in markets where prices had previously surged and where investors made up a larger proportion of earlier home purchases.
Delinquencies Continue to Rise
Mortgage delinquency rates have risen in recent months, particularly for adjustablerate subprime loans. We expect delinquency rates for such loans to rise at least through the middle of next year, as many of the subprime loans made after the housing market peaked two years ago have experienced a high level of early payment defaults. Delinquency rates on fixed-rate subprime loans and prime conventional loans have risen far less. ABX spreads have moved largely sideways but remain at extremely wide levels, which means it remains tough for lenders to sell mortgages into the secondary market.
Published on Tue, Oct 16 2007, 06:34 GMT
Mon, Jun 18 2007, 07:35 GMT
by Mark Vitner, John Silvia
This past week’s sell off in the bond market sent the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury bond up to 5.31 percent, which is more than a 40 basis points higher than it was three weeks ago. The trigger for the run-up in yields has been the sudden turnaround in the economy’s near-term growth prospects, which has thrown cold water on any notion that the Fed would cut interest rates this year or that the economy was headed for recession. The yield curve is now upward sloping, indicating that the investors expect economic growth to accelerate.
Is the rise in rates a one time adjustment or a signal of a sustained trend? Our explanation is that the 5.31 percent threshold will hold for now and that yields may even slide back toward 5.00 percent over the next few weeks. One thing is certain, however. Interest rates were clearly too low three weeks ago. Back then the market was still focusing on the fallout from the unwinding of the housing boom. The collapse of the subprime lending market, the impending reset of adjustable rate mortgages and the rising tide of foreclosures were widely touted as threats to consumer spending and overall economy growth during the second half of the year.
Today the economic outlook has improved substantially. Real GDP growth is now widely expected to rise at a 3.0 percent or better pace during the second quarter. Our own forecast calls for a 3.8 percent increase. Growth during the second half of the year is likely be around three percent, which we believe is close to the economy’s long-term sustainable growth rate.
Tuesday’s sell-off was largely driven by the poor auction results for the Treasury’s 10-year note. By the end of the session, the yield had risen to a 5-year high of 5.26 percent and the yield drifted up to 5.31 percent in after-hours trading.
By Wednesday, it appeared the worst of the bond market rout was over. Retail sales rose much faster than expected in May, surging 1.4 percent overall and 1.0 percent after excluding motor vehicles and gasoline. Those stronger numbers along with a small upward revision to the April data mean that real personal consumption expenditures probably climbed at around a three percent pace during the second quarter. But rather than selling off on this news, the bond market rallied and yields drifted down toward 5.20 percent.
The drop in yields that followed the stronger retail sales figures is encouraging. For now, 5.31 percent likely marks the upper end of the trading range for the 10-year note, while 5.00 percent likely marks the lower end. Back in early May, the yield on the 10-year was around 4.60 percent.
The rise in long-term interest rates and return of a positively sloped yield curve likely signals increased expectations for economic growth and not increased concerns about inflation. Another way of looking at this is to look at the yield on the 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS), which have risen 60 basis points over the past six weeks. Since the spread between the 10-year Treasury note and the 10- year TIPS has not changed materially, all of the increase in the TIPS yield is due to higher real interest rates, or what economists refer to as the opportunity costs of money. In other words, investors expect economic growth to improve.
The Fed’s Beige Book also had some bond friendly news in it. The economy is reported to be growing modestly and higher energy prices do not seem to be spilling over into the prices of other goods and services or to be impacting inflation expectations. The tone of the Beige Book also appears to much more subtle than the gains we have seen in most of the major indicators this past months, including the ISM report, the employment data, and the May retail sales report.
With so much action earlier in the week, the bond market barely budged after the long awaited Consumer Price Index (CPI) number. The headline CPI came in about as expected, with higher energy costs driving the overall CPI up 0.7 percent. The gain puts the CPI up at a 7.0 percent annual rate over the past three months, almost entirely due to a spectacular surge in gasoline prices. Gasoline prices rose 10.5 percent in May and are up at a 168.2 percent annual rate over the past three months.
From the bond market and Fed’s perspectives, the key question on the inflation is how much of the surge in gasoline prices has passed through into the prices of other goods & services and how has that influenced inflation expectations. So far the answer to this question has been surprisingly little. The core CPI rose just 0.1 percent, with modest gains in housing costs, declines in prices for apparel and new motor vehicles, and unusual restraint in prices of prescription and nonprescription drugs. The ongoing correction in the housing market should continue to cut into rent and owners’ equivalent rent, which make up close to 40 percent of the core CPI. As a result, we should continue to see only modest gains in core inflation.
Friday’s CPI report was the last piece of data that presented a significant risk to the bond market, and the modest 0.1% growth on the core was reassuring to the bond market. Most of the reports we will receive over the next three weeks should be relatively market friendly. The housing data are widely expected to weaken and we should see a reversal of last month’s peculiar rise in new home sales. We also suspect we will see at least a partial reversal in some of the recent strength in the regional Fed surveys. The next big unknown for the markets may be the advance report on durable goods, due out on June 27, which is just before the Fed’s June 27/28 FOMC meeting.
A few weeks back we wrote in our weekly commentary that ‘there are no monsters under the bed or in the closet.’1 The piece referred to what we felt were irrational fears about the correction in housing market, the impending reset of adjustable rate mortgages, and the apparent lack of capital spending. The financial markets have finally gotten the message. Yields were too low three weeks ago because concerns about the economy were considerably overblown. We now see the market turning full circle, with optimism about the economy just a bit over the top.
Let’s start with the economic outlook. We boosted our forecast for second quarter GDP the very same day first quarter growth was revised down by 0.7 percentage points to 0.6 percent. A good part of that downward revision was due to a larger drawdown in inventories and a wider trade deficit during the first quarter. The current quarter will see a reversal of these trends, with inventories and trade adding to growth. We boosted our forecast 0.3 percentage points to 3.8 percent.
Does 3.8 percent real GDP growth in the second quarter represent a major change in the economic outlook? The answer is, somewhat surprisingly, no. If you average first quarter growth with our estimate of second quarter growth it comes to around 2.2 percent, which is roughly equivalent to where the economy has been the last four quarters. The biggest change, however, is what comes later in the forecast. After decelerating for the better part of a year, the economy is now reaccelerating. The bulk of the drag from the housing slowdown is now behind us and we are finally beginning to see some encouraging signs in business fixed investment.
There is now considerably less downside risk to the economy and this has greatly diminished the chance that the Fed will cut short-term interest rates this year. We believe the chances of a rate hike, however, are pretty slim. Much of the renewed optimism about the economy stems from the better than expected ISM manufacturing and non-manufacturing surveys, as well as regional surveys such as the Chicago Purchasing Managers’ Index.
The ISM and regional purchasing managers’ surveys are diffusion indices. They measure the breadth of improvement or deterioration in the economy not the magnitude. A reading above 50 means that more purchasing managers see business conditions improving than see conditions weakening. Since so many purchasing managers were unduly pessimistic about the economy a few months ago, particularly on the manufacturing side, it was relatively easy for these series to bounce back in May. Conversely, today’s optimism about the economy will make it harder for the ISM and regional indices to post additional gains in June and July. We look for these reports to give back some of their recent gains in coming months, which may provide some relief for the bond market.
Most other economic indicators, including employment and retail sales, will also likely soften a bit during the summer. Our current forecast for third quarter real GDP calls for a gain of around 2.8 percent and we still feel comfortable with that forecast.
We are in the process of updating our interest rate forecast to incorporate the latest moves in the bond market. Our June forecast was largely put together in late May and early June, when the yield on the 10-year Treasury note was nearly 40 basis points lower than it is today and the yield curve was essentially flat. Forecasting interest rates is always hazardous duty, particularly in the midst of a market rout.
Alan Greenspan noted in a speech to the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association Tuesday that bond yields were likely in the midst of a cyclical upturn that could take interest rates higher than many people currently expect. We agree with this view but caution investors to remember that there are some seasonal and technical pressures that likely magnified the most recent jump in rates. Oftentimes we see some upward pressure on bond yields after taxes are paid on April 15. This year, with large numbers of households being hit by the Alternative Minimum Tax was no exception, leaving a little liquidity in the marketplace.
Economic growth is likely to strengthen in coming quarters, as business investment ramps up and the drag from the housing slump diminishes. With little slack in the economy, inflation is unlikely to decelerate to any significant degree but we do not see it becoming a major problem in 2007 either. In this environment, the Fed will likely remain on hold through the rest of this year and will not tighten until they see some sign that housing has bottomed out. We think that will put the first tightening in the spring or early summer of next year. The yield curve should retain its positive slope, which it only recently regained.
The yield on the 10-year Treasury note has largely been below nominal GDP growth for the past 5 years, which is not sustainable. Remember that an interest rate has three components: opportunity cost, which we believe is best represented by nominal GDP; the time value of money, which was consistently around 135 basis points before the Fed and other central banks began to flood the economy with liquidity in the wake of the Asian Economic crisis in the late 1990s; and a risk premium, which is irrelevant for Treasuries. The U.S. Treasury cannot go out of business.
As we noted back in our March 6 piece, March Madness and Global Liquidity,2 longterm Treasury yields below nominal GDP clearly do not make sense. What this literally says is that if you could borrow enough money, you could buy the entire U.S. economy and make money on the spread, the mother of all arbitrage opportunities. Maybe this is why we have seen so much hedge fund and private equity activity.
We now expect the yield on the 10-year Treasury note to either equal nominal GDP or slightly exceed it. With real GDP likely to expand at around a 3 percent pace and inflation likely to rise at a little over a 2 percent, a reasonable expectation for the 10- year note in the near-term would be somewhere between 5.00 percent and 5.50 percent through the end of this year.
Yields should generally rise over the forecast period, although we will almost certainly see some seasonal pullbacks along the way. A year from now we expect the yield on the 10-year note to be closer to 6 percent and expect the 10-year note to end 2008 at slightly above that level. This is a much different environment than we have become accustomed to in recent years but is generally consistent with an economy moving into the mature phase of the business cycle, when there is less slack available in the U.S. and global economies.
Published on Mon, Jun 18 2007, 07:35 GMT
Mon, Jun 11 2007, 15:33 GMT
by Jason Schenker
Global growth is likely to slow this year to 4.3 percent from 5.4 percent last year. Although we believe the growth rate this year will be slower year over year, it is still above-trend historically. Economic growth so far this year has been somewhat of a mixed bag, with some economies exhibiting moderation and others continuing to remain strong. The slowing of growth is largely the result of central bank moves to raise policy rates across a number of economies. While emerging markets and developed economies could be a mixed bag growth-wise this year, inflationary pressures are likely to ease in most economies. U.S. inflationary concerns are, according to the May FOMC minutes, “the predominant policy concern” of the Fed. Despite a slowdown in growth in the United States, we find that the Fed has likely pulled off a soft landing, and that growth is likely to rebound after the first quarter. At the same time, globally, we also see a similar soft landing scenario coming to fruition.
The drags on U.S. GDP growth probably will diminish this year. Housing is likely to be less of a drag, as are the auto and trucking sectors. With consumer spending bolstered by a low unemployment rate and continued job gains, we expect U.S. GDP to be around 2.2 percent for all of 2007. This is lower than the 3.3 percent real GDP growth rate seen in the United States last year and also lower than our forecasted real GDP growth rate for 2008 of 3.3 percent.
After depreciating earlier this year, the dollar has stabilized versus most major currencies over the past month due in part to shifting expectations about Fed policy going forward. Statements by Fed Chairman Bernanke and positive economic indicators point to strength—and future Fed rate hikes. Our forecast released this month includes revisions to our Fed expectations. We were previously forecasting one rate hike in 2008, but we have now revised our forecast to include two rate hikes. Consumer confidence, ISM surveys, a low unemployment rate and a number of other economic indicators point toward potential Fed hikes next year.
As little as a month ago, many investors expected the Fed to cut rates this year. However, stronger-than-expected data over the past few weeks have led many market participants to conclude that the U.S. economy does not need an easing of monetary policy. U.S. bond yields and Fed futures have risen, lending some support to the greenback. Although the dollar could rally in the near term, we do not believe that sustained appreciation is imminent. Indeed, we continue to project that the greenback will trend lower over the next few quarters.
As is widely known, the United States continues to post massive current account deficits that need to be financed via net capital inflows. Although foreign purchases of U.S. securities remain at high levels, they appear to be trending slowly lower. At the same time, U.S. purchases of foreign securities have jumped recently, meaning that net capital inflows have weakened. Lower net capital inflows have put downward pressure on the greenback.
We believe interest rate differentials will need to move back in favor of dollar assets for a sustained dollar rally to take place. While Fed rate hikes are still about a year away, other central banks, which generally have lagged the Federal Reserve in this tightening cycle, will likely continue to hike rates, and with good reason. Growth rates in most foreign economies remain very solid, and it is hard to make a convincing case that global financial conditions are restrictive at present. Although inflation rates in most foreign economies remain benign, foreign central banks may take preemptive steps to ensure that inflation rates do indeed remain under control. Therefore, rates abroad should continue to head higher at a modest pace.
Looking far ahead, our forecast calls for the dollar to strengthen in the second half of next year. We generally try to refrain from picking turning points in dollar exchange rates far in the future. However, the greenback has been depreciating on a trend basis for five years, and it is bound to turn around sooner or later. Besides, the turnaround we project is consistent with our expectations that the FOMC will tighten anew next year. As interest rate differentials move back in favor of the dollar, the relative attractiveness of dollar assets will begin to improve, which should lead to stronger capital inflows. To reiterate, we believe that the dollar will weaken further before it begins a sustained turnaround. In our view, higher rates in the United States are needed before a trend change in the dollar can begin. Although the FOMC still seems to be a long way from raising rates.
As the dollar has settled into a trading range against most major currencies, so, too, have the prices of most metals and energy commodities. Although oil remains elevated by numerous geopolitical concerns, the price has been relatively rangebound for months. The prospect that oil prices may have settled in for a number of years in the $60-$65 range seems a likely possibility. Retail gasoline prices are a major concern in the United States, but retail prices could very well be more moderate next summer, but are also likely to be higher this coming winter than they were this past winter. This means that consumer price inflation could be subject to less upward pressure at the headline level as those gasoline prices ease on a year over year basis next year. Indeed, the threat to U.S. inflation levels next year comes largely from continued increases in capacity utilization and a continued tightening of the labor force.
In the near term, the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil is likely to continue trading at a discount to Brent crude. However, we see the crude oil premium as narrowing in coming quarters. In the longer run, natural gas prices are likely to increase on-trend as a result of changes in carbon emissions regulations. The longrun increase in the price of natural gas and elevated crude prices are likely to support metals prices in coming quarters. While most commodity prices might not surge in coming quarters as they have done in recent years, they are likely to remain high historically.
Published on Mon, Jun 11 2007, 15:33 GMT
Fri, Jun 8 2007, 15:56 GMT
by Adam York, Mark Vitner
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke noted this past week that “the slowdown in residential construction now appears likely to remain a drag on economic growth for somewhat longer than previously expected.”1 While the data from the housing sector continues to be mixed, we have not materially changed our view on the housing sector. We continue to believe that the bulk of the drag from the unwinding of the housing boom is behind us and see a good chance that home sales will bottom out in the next few months. Housing starts and residential construction, however, will continue to decline through at least the end of this year, and may not hit bottom until early 2008.
Chairman Bernanke’s remarks to the International Monetary Conference noted that the 16.3 percent reduction in residential construction over the past year had shaved about one percentage off of real GDP growth. On a sequential basis, residential construction declined at an 11.1 percent annual rate during the second quarter of 2006, 18.7 percent pace in the third quarter, 19.8 percent rate in the fourth, and at a 15.4 percent pace in the first quarter. We expect residential construction to continue decline in coming quarters but for the declines to become progressively smaller.
In terms of its impact on real GDP, the decline in residential construction has shaved 0.9 percentage points off GDP growth. Put differently, if residential construction spending simply remained unchanged, real GDP growth over the past year would have been 2.8 percent instead of 1.9 percent. Such comparisons by economists often seem confounding to the general public but actually provide a great deal of information. As the decline in residential construction diminishes, overall economic growth will likely ramp back up to this higher underlying rate, particularly since, as the Fed has often noted, we have not seen any significant spillover from the housing slowdown into other areas of the economy.
The economic picture outside of the housing sector is even brighter when you take into account that inventory liquidations have sliced another 0.4 percentage points off growth during the past year. That puts the underlying rate of real GDP growth at better than 3 percent, which probably explains why employment, income and consumer spending have held up so well amid the slowdown in the housing sector.
Solid economic growth will eventually pave the way for a recovery in the housing sector. Remember that housing does not drive the economy. The economy drives the demand for housing. The demand housing is a derived demand, which is derived from the underlying growth in the economy. Stronger job and income growth will eventually lead to a rebound in home sales, which will help chip away at the inventory of unsold homes. The process is just now getting underway.
We have slightly reduced our forecast for sales and new construction in 2007 but the outline of our forecast remains virtually the same as it has for the past several months. We expect home sales to bottom out this summer, at levels 3 to 5 percent lower than they were in early spring. Discounting by homebuilders and the widely reported rise in home foreclosures will likely lead larger price declines in markets where speculative activity was rampant back in the summer of 2005. These price declines will help restore housing affordability in some of the higher priced markets, although rising mortgage rates will offset some of the price drop.
Published on Fri, Jun 8 2007, 15:56 GMT
Fri, May 25 2007, 10:03 GMT
by Jason Schenker
Published on Fri, May 25 2007, 10:03 GMT
Fri, May 25 2007, 09:51 GMT
by Jay H. Bryson
What do China and Kuwait have in common? If you answered that they both recently made changes to their respective exchange rate regimes, then you are right on the money. On Friday May 18, China widened the daily fluctuation band of the yuan/dollar exchange rate from 0.3% to 0.5%, which, in theory, gives Beijing the ability to speed up the rate of renminbi appreciation that has been painfully slow to date.1 Three days later, Kuwait dropped the fixed exchange rate of the Kuwaiti dinar versus the U.S. dollar to a peg based on a basket of currencies. Thus, both the renminbi and the dinar could now move more against the dollar than in the recent past.
When we look around the world, there are not many currencies that remain fixed to the dollar. There are the other countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Kuwait’s decision to move to a peg based on a currency basket raises the probability that some of these countries may follow suit.2 Another major economy with a fixed exchange rate is Hong Kong, which has effectively maintained a fixed value of the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar since 1983.3 Could Hong Kong be in line to make a change to its exchange rate regime?
Before we attempt to answer that question, let’s quickly review why China and Kuwait each made a change to its respective exchange rate regime. Although the Chinese government did not offer an official explanation for its move, we have our hunches. First, a faster rate of appreciation would serve China’s economic interests. As shown in Exhibit 1, CPI inflation in China is on the rise again, and faster exchange rate appreciation would help to restrain inflationary pressures. Indeed, Chinese officials worry about overheating. Second, Beijing’s geopolitical interests are served by widening the exchange rate band. The Bush administration and many U.S. lawmakers have been calling on China to speed up the pace of renminbi appreciation. With a delegation of high-level Chinese officials on its way to Washington this week, the timing of last week’s announcement is no mystery.
Kuwait’s decision to change its exchange rate regime from a dollar peg to a peg based on a basket of currencies also was done because of economic reasons. Exhibit 1 shows that CPI inflation in Kuwait has consistently exceeded the central bank’s target of 2% over the last three years. About one-third of Kuwait’s imports come from the European Union. The depreciation of the dollar vis-à-vis the euro over the past few years, which has resulted in dinar depreciation versus the euro, has raised import prices, thereby helping to feed inflation. By pegging the dinar to a basket of currencies rather than exclusively to a weakening dollar, Kuwaiti authorities hope to reduce imported inflation.
Moreover, China and Kuwait are both experiencing fundamental economic changes that bolster the economic case for real currency appreciation. Kuwait is a resource-based economy whose chief export (petroleum) has experienced a price boom over the past few years. Kuwait’s current account surplus has shot up to about 40% of GDP. Money is just pouring into the country, and the sound economic policy response is to allow the currency to appreciate on a real basis. Likewise, the Chinese economy is undergoing a long-run structural transformation. As the productivity gap between China and the rest of the world narrows, the currency should appreciate.
With that overview in mind, let’s return to the original question. Could Hong Kong make a change to its exchange rate regime? Although anything is possible, we think the probability of a change is very low, at least in the foreseeable future. First, inflation in Hong Kong is not much of an issue at present (see Exhibit 1). The low rate of inflation over the past three years follows nearly six years of deflation. Indeed, the overall level of consumer prices in Hong Kong remains more than 10% below the peak in 1998.
Moreover, there are not the same secular reasons for currency appreciation in Hong Kong as there are in China and Kuwait. Yes, real GDP growth in Hong Kong has been strong over the past few years, due in part to robust growth in mainland China.4 However, the structure of the Hong Kong economy is much closer to the U.S. economy than it is to either the Chinese or Kuwaiti economies. That is, Hong Kong is a developed economy that is driven almost exclusively by services, not by resource extraction or a booming manufacturing sector. The economic rationale for real currency appreciation in Hong Kong is not as clear cut as it is in China and Kuwait.
Finally, Hong Kong’s fixed exchange rate to the U.S. dollar has served it well over the past twenty years. The old American saying of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” may apply in the case of Hong Kong’s exchange rate regime. Therefore, we expect that the Hong Kong Monetary Authority will maintain the effective peg of the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar for the foreseeable future.
However, that does not mean the peg is forever immutable. As Hong Kong’s economy becomes even more integrated with the economy of the mainland, an alteration of the exchange rate regime becomes more likely. Perhaps Hong Kong authorities will someday decide to tie their currency more closely with the yuan by, say, pegging to a basket of currencies that includes the yuan.
In the longer-run there is also the possibility that the Hong Kong dollar will someday simply cease to exist. China will regain full sovereignty over Hong Kong in 2047. Will Beijing allow one city in China to retain its own currency? Probably not. The Hong Kong dollar may not even make it 40 years longer. As the renminbi becomes convertible, Hong Kong residents may start to transact in yuan instead of Hong Kong dollars. To paraphrase General Douglas MacArthur, the Hong Kong dollar may “just fade away.” To reiterate, however, the Hong Kong dollar will be a viable currency for the foreseeable future, and it very likely will remain pegged to the U.S. dollar at its current exchange rate for some time.
Published on Fri, May 25 2007, 09:51 GMT
Thu, May 24 2007, 07:14 GMT
by Jason Schenker
Published on Thu, May 24 2007, 07:14 GMT
Tue, Nov 21 2006, 17:36 GMT
by John Silvia
In our presentation today we will first review the economic outlook. Second, we cover the economic fundamentals underlying that outlook along with the associated measures of credit risk. Finally, we will contrast those economic and risk measures and draw observations on the supervisory challenges in the year ahead.
Published on Tue, Nov 21 2006, 17:36 GMT
Fri, Nov 17 2006, 11:08 GMT
by Mark Vitner
I first became acquainted with Milton Friedman in the spring of 1973, when I was ten years old. I remember asking my father why the price of candy bars had risen from 10 cents to 15 cents. At the time, I was on a fixed income of 50 cents a week and my potential candy bar consumption had been cut by two thirds. I remember asking my father why the president could not simply ask the candy bar manufacturers to lower their prices by a nickel or why he could not order everyone to lower their prices by a nickel. While my father was a wise man, rather than try to explain an economics course to me he suggested that I go to the library and checkout a copy of Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom. From there, my life long love of economics began.
Friedman’s greatest contribution was to take theoretical economic concepts and apply them to real world problems. He did this in such a way that a motivated ten year old could understand them. Most of Friedman’s proposed ideas were once thought to be far fetched. Many are in use today, such as an all volunteer military, tradable pollution credits, school choice, floating exchange rates, removing the interest rates ceilings on bank accounts and the notion that the growth rate of the money supply has an impact on the rate of inflation.
His books, particularly Free to Choose, helped shape the Reagan Revolution during the 1980s that helped turn around a moribund economy that many of the “brightest minds in America” had already written off. Some policies, such as removing price controls on domestic oil production, were put in place immediately, while others, such as reducing and simplifying tax policy and welfare reform are still very much a work in progress. His theories broadly shaped the battle on inflation that Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan so skillfully executed. The net result of these policies has been the strongest run of economic growth in world history and a remarkable reduction in the rate of inflation.
I had the good fortune of meeting Milton Friedman around twenty years ago at the National Association of Business Economists meeting in San Francisco. Dr. Friedman was there to receive the Adam Smith award. At the time, I had been an economist for about three years and brought a copy of his seminal work A Monetary History of the United States for him to autograph. When I first approached Dr. Friedman and his wife Rose, I must confess they seemed a bit annoyed that I would bother them for an autograph. But as soon as I let him know that I had studied under one of his favorite students, Richard Timberlake, he smiled broadly and quickly took the book and flipped through it to see what I had highlighted and underlined. We had a short conversation about chocolate bars and inflation and he allowed me to have our picture taken together.
Milton Friedman will be remembered as one of the greatest economists of all time, along with such greats such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Ludwig von Mises, John Maynard Keynes, and Fredrich Hayek. While most famously known as the father of monetarism, his ideas shaped entire schools of economics and will continue to be put into use by future presidents and policymakers.
Published on Fri, Nov 17 2006, 11:08 GMT
Thu, Nov 16 2006, 12:28 GMT
by Gina Martin, Mark Vitner
Halloween is over, so the holiday music is playing, the online shopping promotions have begun, and forecasters are releasing their best guesses as to how the holiday season will turn out this year. There seems to be about an even split so far between the pessimists, who believe still-high gas prices and struggling sales at discount chains will be too much to overcome, and the optimists, counting on recent strength in wage numbers to help pull shoppers into malls. We’d like to throw our hat into the optimist camp - Holiday 2006 looks like it will be a jolly one for the nation’s retailers. Despite a tough comparison to a very strong season last year, we expect sales1 in November and December to grow 7.4 percent this year
Published on Thu, Nov 16 2006, 12:28 GMT
Wed, Oct 25 2006, 16:31 GMT
by Adam York
Executive Summary
It has been five years since the U.S. Census Bureau converted the inventory and sales data from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) basis to the new North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) basis.1 When the new system was introduced it served to push up the inventory-to-sales ratio for all businesses. The major impact was in the retail sector, where the ratio increased 0.15 on average across the dual reporting period; slight increases were seen in manufacturing while little impact was seen in the wholesale sector. The effects of the change were frequently discussed in the immediate wake of the conversion to NAICS and the release of back data for comparison in 2001. Now, we felt it time to revisit the data in light of our current position in the business cycle and consider what the data suggest for the economy going forward.
Published on Wed, Oct 25 2006, 16:31 GMT
Mon, Oct 16 2006, 07:08 GMT
by Jason Schenker
Published on Mon, Oct 16 2006, 07:08 GMT
Wed, Oct 11 2006, 15:27 GMT
by Jason Schenker
Published on Wed, Oct 11 2006, 15:27 GMT
Tue, Oct 10 2006, 15:33 GMT
by Jay H. Bryson
North Korea announced yesterday that it had successfully detonated a nuclear device. It is no secret that the country has been trying to develop a nuclear bomb, but the announcement of the successful test served to confirm the world’s worst fears.
That said, the fallout in financial markets has been rather muted. Predictably, financial markets in South Korea were affected the most. The South Korean won weakened 1-½% versus the dollar yesterday, a big daily move for that currency, and the South Korean stock market (measured by the KOSPI index) fell 2.4% yesterday, but it bounced back a bit today. However, financial markets in other countries in the region have taken the news in stride. The stock market in Japan, the country after South Korea that would be threatened the most, hardly reacted to the news, as did the Japanese yen.
There clearly are numerous geopolitical ramifications of a nuclear North Korea, which are beyond the scope of this short report. Barring the unthinkable (i.e., a North Korean nuclear strike on South Korea or Japan), which clearly would be devastating, the purely economic and financial implications seem to be rather limited. Yes, the Indian stock market fell 30% in the months after that country’s nuclear test in 1998, and the Pakistani stock market went down 50% Both the Indian and Pakistani currencies depreciated significantly in 1998. However, the financial and economic crises that swept through emerging markets in 1998 probably contributed to the weakness in financial markets in the subcontinent that year. Moreover, sanctions by the West had a direct impact on the Indian and Pakistani economies. Nobody is suggesting that sanctions be placed on South Korea.
The sanctions that are being contemplated against North Korea, which already has very little trade and financial interaction with the rest of the world, could weaken that economy further. In the (admittedly low probability) event of a North Korean collapse, the economic spillover on South Korea would be significant. As noted above, the economic and financial ties between the South and the North are rather limited at present. However, as we discuss in a recent report, the drain on the South Korean economy from economic and political reunification of North and South Korea (à la East and West Germany) would be significant.
Barring these worse-case scenarios (i.e., a nuclear strike or a collapse of North Korea), the purely economic and financial implications of North Korea’s announcement seem rather limited. Indeed, Moody’s announced that South Korea’s ratings are unlikely to be affected by the news from Pyongyang. That said, near-term growth prospects in South Korea could be affected somewhat if consumers and businesses turn more cautious.2 In addition, investors may perceive South Korean assets to be a bit more risky. The South Korean stock market, which has underperformed most other stock markets this year, could continue to struggle as foreign investors rethink their desire to hold South Korean equities.
The news has also led us to make some minor changes to our forecast for the Korean won (see Exhibit 1). Our previous forecast of won appreciation versus the greenback was based more on our projection of generalized dollar weakness than it was on anything intrinsic to South Korea. Therefore, we maintain our view of won appreciation versus the greenback on a trend basis. However, we now project that the won will strengthen less against the greenback than we did previously due to a higher risk premium on South Korean assets.
Published on Tue, Oct 10 2006, 15:33 GMT
Tue, Oct 10 2006, 15:29 GMT
by Jay H. Bryson
Published on Tue, Oct 10 2006, 15:29 GMT
Wed, Sep 27 2006, 16:03 GMT
by Jason Schenker
Published on Wed, Sep 27 2006, 16:03 GMT
Wed, Aug 2 2006, 12:16 GMT
by Jason Schenker
Published on Wed, Aug 2 2006, 12:16 GMT
Mon, Jul 31 2006, 09:58 GMT
by Jason Schenker
Published on Mon, Jul 31 2006, 04:58 GMT
Fri, Jul 28 2006, 08:36 GMT
by Jason Schenker
The German economy is in flux and the World Cup, as well as the mid-year, offers us an excellent opportunity to address some of the key economic issues and questions currently surrounding the German economic outlook. The German economy seems to have been gaining strength. However, there are some longer-term issues that pose continued structural issues for the German economy. These longer-term challenges are where our sights should be beyond the next eight quarters. The longer-term outlook for German growth is more dubious than near-term strength that may yet prove fleeting.
At the beginning of the year, there were a number of market participants that viewed the German economy optimistically. We have always viewed the German economy with a guarded optimism. With German GDP growth floating around 1.5 percent year-over-year, there is little reason to celebrate other than the recent World Cup events (Exhibit 1). Real German GDP has accelerated in recent quarters, but growth still remains rates that were posted in 2000. Furthermore, despite surges in German confidence series at the beginning of the year, the biggest threats to the German economy remained fully in place. These risks, remain weak domestic retail consumption and high unemployment.
The two legs supporting German economic growth have been exports and capex. Germany is well-known for its significant exports, which have risen in recent quarters (Exhibit 2) largely as a manifestation of strong global demand. This also means that if global growth slows over the next eight quarters, as we anticipate it will, the German economy could be more significantly exposed on the downside.
In tandem with the rise in German domestic production of goods for export, has been a concomitant rise in capital expenditures. Over the past seven quarters, German capex has risen (Exhibit 3). Business investment in coming quarters is likely to continue to be critical for German growth, especially as higher energy costs, higher interest rates and a higher value added tax (VAT) rate threaten the purchasing power of German consumers.
While the strength of the German economy has manifested itself in exports, manufacturing and capex, the retail sector looks dismal. German retail sales in May were essentially flat compared to the same month last year (Exhibit 4). That’s right: despite economic growth and a declining unemployment rate, Germans have barely increased their domestic retail consumption over last year. Like the U.S. and other G7 countries, Germany has long since transitioned to a service-based consumer economy. Despite this fact, consumers are not yet on the band wagon. Furthermore, the expected rise in the German VAT tax next year is not likely to help consumer spending either.
Aside from a high savings rate stemming from a savings tradition and exacerbated by country-wide fears about the imminent collapse of the German social system, high levels of unemployment have not helped the retail sector. After all, with 10.9 percent unemployment, how can you blame German consumers for not spending their euros? High German unemployment rates are largely the result of high costs of labor and costs of labor termination, and although there has been a gradual diminution in unemployment since the beginning of 2005, German unemployment rates remain among the highest in the Euro-zone, and much higher than the Euro-zone average (Exhibit 5). The aberrational and sizable bump-up in the beginning of 2005 can be attributed to the new statistics implemented under Hartz IV employment legislation. This legislation was designed to encourage workers to find employment, even if it should be at a lesser level of qualification or rate of pay than their previous employ. There have been objections to the pressures Hartz IV places on discouraged workers, but it is also likely responsible for the reduction of the number of workers on the dole.
An even more pronounced cause for employment concern is the repercussion the division of Germany has had on the disparity of employment. The former East German states continue to experience much worse unemployment than their former West German counterparts (Exhibit 6).
The high rate of German unemployment continues to pose a significant secular challenge to German economic growth in both the near- and medium-term. The aging German population has also taken the threat of German social security collapse quite seriously, and this has further hampered consumers focused on the potential impact on their incomes. At the same time these longer-term issues are likely to keep consumer expenditures weak, rising interest rates and high energy prices are likely to further assault whatever consumer inclination to spend may remain.
Inflationary pressures in the Euro-zone and Germany have been rising, and the European Central Bank (ECB) has been raising rates as a counter measure. The ECB, which is largely the progeny of the Bundesbank (BuBa), has a single mandate: to control inflation. This most critical single mandate of the BuBa was largely implemented as a result of the German experience with hyperinflation in the 1920’s.
The ECB has a stated inflation target of two percent. The current level of inflation is around 2.5 percent (Exhibit 7). With inflation on the rise, BuBa vigilance has driven the ECB to hike rates twice this year, and is likely to drive the ECB to further rate hikes in coming months. Based on ECB members’ statements, the markets already assume a hike at the next meeting on August 3rd to be a de facto reality.
The German ZEW is a measure of the expectations of future economic growth in Germany over the next six months based on the survey responses of about 350 different institutional investors and analysts. The ZEW was at record levels at the beginning of the year (Exhibit 8), which provided some analysts with the statistical fodder to forecast strong GDP growth this year. The index, however, has since tumbled, which means that if analysts and investors are correct, a significant slowing in growth in the second half of the year is likely.
The IFO index, which is more strongly correlated with German GDP growth than the ZEW index was also on the uptake at the beginning of the year, and is now even higher despite a pull-back in June. The extremely mixed signal the IFO is sending is somewhat odd. Like the ZEW, the IFO also provides a reading of how the economy will perform over the next six months, but is based on survey responses from approximately 7000 companies. So, companies are a bit more optimistic, while investors and analysts seem skittish. This sounds familiar to Americans, who have seen a choppy summer for equities and mixed signals from the Fed. Furthermore, while U.S. consumers are likely to reduce their spending, business investment is likely to support growth. In Germany, this also appears to be the case.
We believe that the euro, like most major currencies, is likely to appreciate against the greenback in coming quarters. Fed rate hikes over the past year provided fundamentally dollar-bullish interest rate differentials (Exhibit 9) , but with the Fed nearing the end of its interest rate hiking cycle, and the ECB (as well as other central banks) ramping up their hiking cycle, the tide seems poised to turn against the dollar. The massive expansion of the U.S. current account deficit is also likely to provide a further weight on the back of a dollar being pushed to weakness by fundamental interest rate differentials. As such, we are forecasting a mild and gradual depreciation of the dollar against the euro in coming quarters (Exhibit 10).
Published on Fri, Jul 28 2006, 03:36 GMT
Tue, Jul 25 2006, 07:51 GMT
by Mark Vitner
Price increases have also intensified a few steps back in the production process. The Producer Price Index (PPI) for finished goods has increased 4.9 percent over the past year, which is actually down a bit from the 5.4 percent year-to-year gain posted at the end of 2005. Finished goods prices rose 4.2 percent in 2004. Excluding food and energy prices, finished goods prices have been relatively well behaved, rising 1.9 percent over the past year, compared to a 1.4 percent gain between December 2004 and December 2005.
Looking a little further back in the production process, prices for intermediate materials, supplies and components are up 9.3 percent over the past year. Excluding food and energy items, core intermediate goods prices have increased 9.6 percent. Prices for raw materials have increased even more dramatically, with prices for crude materials rising 8.6% and prices for crude materials, excluding food and energy items, leaping 33.7 percent.
Import prices are not directly factored into the PPI, although the competition from imports does impact the ability of domestic producers to increase prices. Moreover, the stronger demand for raw materials from emerging economies is helping drive up the prices of raw materials. Overall import prices are currently running 7.2 percent above their year ago level. Most of that increase is due to soaring oil prices. Excluding petroleum, import prices are up 2.2 percent over the past year.
The last inflation measure that we will highlight is the one that the Federal Reserve cites most often as their preferred inflation gauge. The price deflator for Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) is published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis along with data on personal income and spending. The PCE price deflator utilizes a great deal of the price data from the Consumer Price Index. The PCE price data, however, are “chain-weighted” so that they reflect consumers changing consumption patterns. If prices of beef rise dramatically and consumers buy more chicken, then chicken prices will get a higher weight and beef prices will get a lower weight. The CPI is based on a fixed-weighted market basket of goods and services.
The Federal Reserve prefers to utilize the core PCE price deflator, which excludes food and energy items. The exclusion of food and energy items is done for two reasons. Food and energy prices are extremely volatile and make it more difficult to discern the underlying trend in inflation. In addition, there is little that monetary policy can do to directly influence food and energy prices. If there is a drought in the Midwest that forces up grain prices, the Fed can not make it rain. Similarly, the Fed has little sway over OPEC or even U.S. energy policy. By contrast, price increases for virtually everything else are influenced by monetary policy. The core PCE deflator best represents the part of inflation the Fed can do something about.
Wachovia’s Inflation Chartbook will periodically take a look at the key inflation measures and their major components. We will also identify the factors we believe will shape the near-term inflation outlook and our forecast for inflation and interest rates.
Any discussion about inflation invariably starts with the Consumer Price Index, which is the most often cited measure of inflation. The CPI has accelerated considerably over the past four years and is currently up 4.3 percent over the past year. Excluding food and energy prices, the core CPI is up somewhat less, climbing 2.6 percent over the past year.
Most of the acceleration in the overall CPI has come from higher energy costs. Energy items account for just 8.7 percent of the overall CPI, with motor fuels and household fuels accounting for roughly even proportions of that total. Prices for motor fuels have surged in recent years, soaring 26.1 percent in 2004 and climbing another 16.2 percent in 2005. Gasoline prices soared again this year, rocketing up at nearly a 52 percent annual rate over the past six months. Fortunately, prices for household fuels have risen more modestly. The cost of fuel oil has increased at a 9.6 percent annual rate over the past six months, while prices for residential natural gas have fallen at a 15.5 percent pace.
Food and beverages account for 15.05 percent of the overall CPI and have been relatively well behaved in recent years. Food prices rose just 2.3 percent in 2005, which was slightly less than the 2.7 percent gain the prior year. Grocery store prices account for just over half of the total weight of food and beverages and prices there have been fairly well behaved, climbing just 1.7 percent last year and 2.4 percent in 2004. Prices have risen even less rapidly this year, inching up at just a 1.2 percent annual rate over the past six months. Prices for food eaten away from home (restaurants) have picked up a bit, however, climbing at a 3.6 percent annual rate over the past six months. The cost of dining out rose 3.2 percent in 2005 and 3.0 percent the prior year. The higher costs this year likely reflect rising wage and salary costs.
Published on Tue, Jul 25 2006, 02:51 GMT
Wed, Jun 28 2006, 17:08 GMT
by Mark Vitner
Published on Wed, Jun 28 2006, 12:08 GMT
Wells Fargo Investments, LLC
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